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Trade Credit or Bank Credit? – Lessons 
Learned from Hungarian Firms between 2010 
and 2015*
Dániel Havran – Péter Kerényi – Attila Víg
This paper addresses the way in which trade credit was used by Hungarian firms 
in the period between 2010 and 2015. Relying on Burkart and Ellingsen’s (2004) 
theory of trade credit, we use panel data on 14,554 Hungarian firms (including 
68 large corporations) to estimate the relationship of trade credit and short-term 
bank credit. Estimated on sub-samples broken down by profitability, our results only 
confirm a complementary relationship. We also examine the relationship separately 
for each category of firm size. We found a complementary relationship for small 
and microenterprises, whereas the results obtained for large corporations imply a 
substitution effect. In Hungary, in the period after 2013 accounts payable tended 
to be increased by financially constrained micro and medium-sized enterprises and 
mostly held steady by financially unconstrained firms.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: G32, C23
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1. Introduction
Firms consider trade credit to be an important channel of external funding, 
particularly in cases when they have no other access to finance. Trade credit is 
often a substitute for short-term bank credit, while it is also possible that access to 
bank credit is facilitated by the willingness of suppliers that are more familiar with 
the firm to finance it. Accordingly, in various stages of the business cycle, certain 
firms rely on trade credit more heavily, and others less so. In recent years, Hungarian 
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firms experienced both a period of recession in the financing environment and the 
subsequent recovery. This paper is concerned with how accounts payable were 
used for financing purposes in the period between 2010 and 2015 by Hungarian 
non-financial and non-utility firms which draw up annual accounts.
For the same period, a number of studies have been produced on the trends in 
the funding of Hungarian firms, mostly addressing the practice of bank financing or 
the effect of stimulating credit supply (Funding for Growth Scheme), e.g. Csubák – 
Fejes 2015; Bálint – Fellner 2016, 2017; Bokor – Hidasi 2014; Endrész – Harasztosi 
– Lieli 2015. In the literature, few analyses have been carried out on the use of 
trade credit in respect of the past years (Szűcs 2008; Nábelek 2016). However, 
understanding firms’ short-term financing practices could vary and complement the 
overall picture about long-term financing. With our paper, it is on that issue that 
we wish to contribute to the Hungarian discourse on corporate finance.
Our analysis has both cross-sectional and temporal aspects.
In taking a cross-sectional approach, we seek to explore whether in the period 
concerned, trade credit was used by firms to complement or substitute bank 
credit. We rely on Burkart and Ellingsen’s (2004) model to establish the theoretical 
framework required to address this issue. To segment firms, we use indices 
representing firms’ financial constraints – Kaplan–Zingales1, Whited–Wu2, Cleary3 
– as well as corporate profitability (low, medium and high EBIT/ASSET), in contrast 
to the empirical work of Cunningham (2005), who used firms’ “wealth” (i.e. profit, 
a proxy for the size of internal or own funds) to measure the presence of financial 
constraints. The propositions of theory are only supported by our estimates 
unambiguously for small and microenterprises.
We are also interested in the extent to which the result changes according to the 
category of firm size. Using Hungarian data, our empirical results mostly confirm 
that for large and medium-sized enterprises, there is no or only weak substitution 
between trade credit and bank credit, whereas the relationship is complementary 
for small and microenterprises. We find that the presence of accounts receivable 
also leads to increased use of trade credit, and that the effect is the strongest in 
the case of financially constrained firms.
Owing to the difference in the relationship between these channels of finance, 
firms respond differently to cyclical changes. In the period under review, the pattern 
emerging in the use of trade credit may be pro-cyclical for some firms (with the 
volume of accounts payable falling in crisis and growing in recovery), and counter-
1  Kaplan – Zingales (1997)
2  Whited – Wu (2006)
3  Cleary (1999)
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cyclical for others (with days outstanding becoming longer in crisis and shorter in 
recovery). Could it be argued that firms tend to accumulate payables during times 
of crisis? Or, conversely, do payables increase when firms use them to finance their 
growth during times of recovery? Industry character notwithstanding, what are the 
characteristics of firms in these two groups? What was the level of volatility in each 
case? Although less reliably in statistical terms, the empirical analysis of cyclicality 
has found the accumulation of payables in the recovery period to be a feature of 
financially constrained firms, whereas with financially unconstrained firms days 
payable outstanding did not increase in the period of recovery. These tendencies 
could mostly be shown for small and microenterprises.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. First, an overview is offered on the 
general financing situation of Hungarian firms in the period between 2010 and 
2015, and then a theoretical framework is established as a basis for the empirical 
analysis. This is followed by the presentation of data and the approach used. The 
Results section presents tables for the estimates obtained, with the corresponding 
interpretations. A brief summary is provided at the end of the paper.
2. Payables as reflected in corporate finance: 2010–2015
For Hungarian firms, recovery from the 2008 crisis was protracted, with the turning 
point arriving only in 2013/2014 after another dip in 2012. A period characterised by 
financial constraints and pessimistic expectations was followed by one that offered 
improved access to credit and a better outlook. In the following, a brief summary 
is provided of that period in terms of firms’ financing practices. Our primary focus 
will be the MSME segment.
Figure 1 represents some of the trends emerging from the database we processed 
for the period under review. (The Bisnode database, which contains the financial 
accounts collected by the tax authority for all firms in scope, will be explained in 
detail as part of the empirical analysis.) The diagrams show the medians derived 
from individual ratios.
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The settlement of accounts payable took the longest in 2013 in commerce, 
industry and services alike. After 2013, both accounts payable and receivable days 
outstanding became shorter. In firms with bank loans outstanding in the period, 
there was a steady decline in the ratio of short-term loans to total assets. The 
share of long-term bank loans within the balance sheet also declined, although at 
a much slower rate. Relative to total assets, net non-cash working capital remained 
level at around 25–26 per cent, while the median of net trade credit in the sample 
Figure 1
Main trends in corporate finance, 2010–2015 
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Source: Calculations based on data from Bisnode Kft.
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stagnated at around 0 per cent. This also implies that accounts receivable frequently 
correlates with accounts payable, and that out of the components of net working 
capital, the highest financing requirement is attributable to inventories.
According to Csubák and Fejes (2014) and MNB (2015), the volume of lending to 
MSMEs dropped from its 2008 peak of HUF 3,896.9 billion by almost one third to 
HUF 2,753.3 billion in 2011, followed by an increase of some HUF 750 billion in 
2012. The SAFE reports produced in the same period (SAFE 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015) 
show that for small and medium-sized enterprises, access to external finance was 
the most difficult in 2011, following which firms found their situations to be steadily 
improving. At the same time, finding skilled staff became increasingly difficult, while 
a steadily narrowing group of respondents identified market competition as the 
key challenge. A summary of the responses is provided in Table 1. Questionnaire 
responses also show that the period between 2013 and 2015 saw a decrease 
in the ratio of respondents that had their request for financing rejected. As the 
questionnaires for European countries were administered to relatively small samples 
in Hungary, the ratios obtained for the attitudes identified must be treated with 
caution.
Table 1
Main challenges to Hungarian SMEs
(SAFE questionnaire surveys)
Which of the following problems is the most 
challenging for your firm?
2009 2011 2013 2014 2015
Finding customers 43.50% 24.80% 18.90% 16.22% 26.14%
Competition in the market 1.70% 23.50% 17.10% 14.51% 9.57%
Access to finance 18.70% 22.00% 17.30% 14.06% 11.29%
Costs of labour or production 3.10% 6.10% 11.90% 10.73% 12.37%
Availability of skilled staff 4.20% 6.60% 10.90% 18.36% 21.93%
Regulatory environment 12.40% 10.90% 11.20% 14.68% 9.33%
Other 16.40% 6.10% 12.70% 11.44% 9.37%
Source: Data from the SAFE (2011, 2013, 2014, 2015) questionnaire surveys
The MNB’s reports following up on developments in lending (Bálint – Fellner 2016, 
2017) also confirm the tendency perceived by firms, i.e. that the terms of bank 
lending to firms significantly improved from 2013 onwards. The study argues that 
the differential between the lending rate and the cost of funding also dropped, 
collateral requirements and the required level of creditworthiness were eased, 
and the available credit lines increased. From June 2013 onwards, subsidised loans 
(primarily the Funding for Growth Schemes, “FGS”) played a major role in facilitating 
access to finance. While the main focus of FGS 1 was loan replacement, FGS 2, 
launched in autumn 2013, already brought about improvements in the terms of 
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access to working capital and investment loans as well (FGS 3 in 2016 already 
falls outside of the period under review). Analyses are provided in Módos, Bokor 
and Hidasi (2014) and Bokor, Fellner and Plajner (2014) on the developments of 
the period, and in Endrész, Harasztosi and Lieli (2015) on the effect of the FGS on 
investment.
While financing opportunities clearly improved in 2013–2015, developments in the 
demand for finance appear more gloomy. Demand for finance was predominantly 
determined by selling opportunities and expectations of growth. The SME Survey of 
January 2015 by the Institute for Economic and Enterprise Research (“GVI”) (Nyírő 
and Hajdu 2015) shows that while cyclical indicators consistently identify summer 
2009 and summer 2012 as the two troughs, expectations improved considerably 
from 2013. Juhász and Reszegi (2017) conclude that – although the change in 
expectations brought back the sentiment preceding the crisis – firms remained 
unable to produce growth relative to pre-crisis levels. On balance, demand for 
finance grew once the effects of the recession were eliminated; however, that 
meant returning to the previous level without any additional financing requirement 
resulting from growth. Bálint and Fellner’s (2017) report, referred to earlier, also 
investigated developments in credit demand. The authors explain that while 
demand for long-term loans dropped significantly in 2010–2013 and then increased 
again later, no typical trends could be identified in demand for short-term bank 
loans. As a combined result, between early 2010 and 2013 Q2 the growth rate of 
long-term corporate loans was negative in each quarter, but the situation improved 
from 2013 Q3, although without any significant growth yet. Even before the period 
under review, circular debt was common, especially in construction and among 
firms with a headcount below 50 employees (Szűcs 2008), and this persisted even 
in 2016. Such debt generally qualified as past due accounts payable, and often also 
as bad debt from the suppliers’ perspective. According to the GVI survey (Nábelek 
2016), an outstanding improvement was recorded in payment discipline in 2014.
Of respondents to the SAFE (2015) survey, 21.6 per cent had used short-term bank 
financing (credit line, overdraft, credit card) in the preceding six months, and 44 
per cent considered this channel to be relevant to their business. Leases were 
the second most popular form of financing, used by 14.2 per cent of respondents 
recently, and considered as relevant by 37.7 per cent. Collectively, subsidised bank 
loans and grants were used by 8.9 per cent of respondents over the period, and 
29.3 per cent considered them to be relevant. Non-subsidised bank loans were 
used by 6.7 per cent, and other loans by 8.4 per cent of respondents on a six-
month time horizon. Trade credit was both less used (4.3 per cent of respondents) 
and considered to be less relevant (13.22 per cent) than the channels mentioned 
previously. The use of factoring was reported by an even lower percentage. 
According to the MNB Financial Stability Report based on credit institution data 
92 Studies
Dániel Havran – Péter Kerényi – Attila Víg
(MNB 2017), finance was used for investments in tangible assets and the purchase 
of inventories.
Although the cited studies vary as to the precise timing of the turning point due 
to differences in terms of focus, the periods under review and the availability 
of samples, on balance access to finance improved from 2013 Q3 onwards. In 
the banking sector, the volume of loans disbursed increased, but at the level of 
individual firms there was no significant change in the ratio of long-term bank loans 
to total assets. Trade credit was most used in 2013. Although trade credit was not 
listed among the most important sources of external finance, the data suggest that 
it was an important factor in the operations of domestic firms.
3. Theoretical framework
Trade credit can have a variety of unique motivations. In Petersen and Rajan 
(1996), the theories seeking to identify the reasons for the use of trade credit are 
grouped around three motives: (1) special financing advantages (in information 
acquisition, in controlling the buyer, in salvaging value from existing assets); (2) 
price discrimination; and (3) transaction costs.
Financing advantages (1) are built on three different arguments. According to the 
argument based on the first, suppliers – by virtue of their relationship with their 
buyers – may have more extensive and more accurate information, and better 
monitoring opportunities compared to other lenders (Emery 1984; Smith 1987; 
Freixas 1993; Biais and Gollier 1997). Arguments for the supplier’s bargaining power 
over buyers hold that the supplier’s position enables it to control the buyer, or even 
hold it at bay, through its ability to decide on future supplies. In explanations arguing 
with advantages from collateral assets, current assets obtained from the supplier 
may be used as collateral in the event of a payment default, an opportunity that 
cannot be taken in the case of cash advances. In the price discrimination approach 
(2), the phenomenon is captured from the supplier’s point of view: Schwartz (1974) 
construes trade credit as the supplier’s pricing policy, whereas Brennan, Maksimovic 
and Zechner (1988) argue that suppliers apply price discrimination through their 
ability to set more flexible payment terms for more price-sensitive buyers. The 
main proponent of explanations based on transaction costs (3) is Ferris (1981), 
who argues that trade credit exists because payments could be settled cheaper for 
both buyers and suppliers if settlement only takes place periodically (e.g. monthly 
or quarterly).
Burkart and Ellingsen’s (2004) model provides a comprehensive theoretical 
description of the rationale for firms to use trade credit instead of other forms of 
finance. The model allows firms to use both bank finance and trade credit, but with 
both forms of finance there is information asymmetry between the firm and the 
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lender, which imposes a credit constraint. Since under the model the bank knows 
less about the firm than the supplier does, the firm will face stricter constraints 
in the course of obtaining external funding. Consequently, due to the closer 
relationship, the firm can use trade credit even when it no longer has access to 
bank credit. Another difference is that the firm will get cash in the case of bank 
credit, and inputs, i.e. current assets that it can use for production, in the case of 
trade credit. While it is easy for the firm to realise private benefits from the cash, 
it is more difficult to transform less liquid inputs to private benefits. One possible 
consequence is that given a high level of information asymmetry, it is worthwhile 
for a firm to acquire assets by becoming indebted to suppliers, and then to obtain 
bank credit on grounds of the collateralisation so established. Burkart and Ellingsen 
identify that scenario as the case where trade credit is able to complement bank 
credit.
The relationship between the two forms of external funding was investigated 
empirically on samples of US firms by Nilsen (2002), Canadian firms by Cunningham 
(2005), and Chinese firms by Ying, Guo and Yang (2014). Most of their findings are 
consistent with Burkart and Ellingsen’s theory. Burkart and Ellingsen viewed trade 
credit as a source of finance that matured in 1 to 3 months but could be prolonged, 
and loans provided by commercial banks typically maturing in 1 to 3 years. The 
primary focus of the theory is therefore on short-term sources of funding. The 
question of how long-term bank finance is related to trade credit is addressed by 
Fazzari and Petersen (1993) as part of their analysis of US firms’ data. The authors 
observe that investments in fixed assets and net working capital compete with each 
other for finance, which makes long-term bank credit and trade credit possible 
substitutes. Ferrando and Mulier (2013) find that trade credit may also be an 
important source of growth.
The decision between trade credit and bank credit may also be strongly influenced 
by how the firm’s buyers are financed. Firms with the capacity to increase 
their accounts payable will have more room to finance their buyers for price 
discrimination purposes. Moreover, accounts receivable are less liquid than cash, 
and additional collateral may also improve the capacity to borrow from banks. For 
European firms, the components of trade credit were analysed by García-Teruel 
and Martínez-Solano (2010), whose findings, inter alia, confirmed the theory of 
price discrimination.
Decisions on inventories may also play a part in the use of trade credit, as shown 
in a theoretical model by Bougheas, Mateut and Mizen (2007), who also test their 
argument empirically on a sample of firms operating in the UK. Chittenden and 
Bragg (1997) confirm the relationship between inventory holdings and accounts 
payable on samples of three countries (Germany, France, UK). As regards cash 
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holdings, also analysing the data of firms in the UK, Kling, Paul and Gonis (2014) 
find that a higher cash ratio improves access to trade credit.
For our empirical analysis, we invoke the following conclusions by Burkart and 
Ellingsen (2004):
1)  With financially unconstrained firms that are still within their bank debt and 
trade credit capacities, according to the theory complementary, substitution or 
no relationship between short-term bank credit and trade credit may be possible.
2)  With financially constrained firms beyond their capacity for bank debt, short-term 
bank loans and trade credit are:
a)  substitutes in the case of firms that are still within their capacity for trade 
debt; and
b)  complements in the case of firms that are beyond their capacity for trade debt.
The implications can also be extended in terms of business cycles. Where the size 
of bank credit is pro-cyclical over time in a firm (i.e. showing signs of constraints), 
trade credit would be:
•  counter-cyclical in case 2a; and
•  pro-cyclical over time in case 2b.
Therefore, the sensitivity of trade credit to business cycles could vary according 
to the respective levels of the capacity constraint on trade credit and bank credit. 
The authors identify the wealth (own funds) available to the firm as the factor that 
influences whether capacity constraints are reached. Firms with a low level of own 
funds are constrained in their access to both bank credit and trade credit, those with 
a medium level of own funds only in their access to bank credit, and firms with a 
high level of own funds are not constrained in their access to either type of credit.
In our first analysis, we explore how accounts payable are related to short-term 
and long-term lending. We also address the effect of accounts receivable on 
accounts payable. Our second question is whether patterns that are similar to the 
theoretical conclusions are obtained by capturing own funds through firms’ average 
profitability, and the constraints on bank debt in ways commonly reported in the 
literature (using Kaplan–Zingales, Whited–Wu and Cleary indices). In practice, the 
capacity for trade debt can be influenced by a number of factors in addition to 
internal funds. Where a firm has stronger bargaining power over its supplier, it 
may have much greater capacity for trade debt. Therefore, in the third step we 
will investigate the extent to which the relationship between bank credit and trade 
credit varies according to firm size. As an additional fourth step, we profile the 
behaviour of accounts payable over time.
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4. Data and methodology
The data were provided by Bisnode Magyarország Kft. The raw database includes 
all Hungarian firms that use double-entry bookkeeping and submit annual accounts 
to the tax authority. Of that population, our analysis includes Hungarian firms 
that draw up their annual accounts in Hungarian forints and are neither financial 
firms (NACE 6400–6699) nor utility providers (NACE 3500–3799). The sample does 
not include firms submitting simplified annual accounts or the type of accounts 
provided for microenterprises. Although there is a high number of firms of the 
latter type, their collective size is considerably smaller than the group of firms 
submitting annual accounts. Consequently, the macro-weight of the dataset used 
may be considered significant. In cleaning the data, we filtered out firms showing 
economically nonsensical or erroneous items (such as negative total assets or other 
negative balance sheet items), and where we found missing data that could not be 
provided (e.g. missing P/L accounts), we also filtered out the corresponding firm/
year observations. Subsequently, the dataset used for analysis was constructed to 
include firms for which the database contained balance sheets and P/L accounts 
for at least three consecutive years.
This corresponds to a total of 14,554 firms, comprised of 68 large corporations, 1,332 
medium-sized enterprises, 4,354 small enterprises, and 8,800 microenterprises 
according to the EU sales classification. Except for financial firms and utility 
providers, which operate using different a business logic, our database thus includes 
all Hungarian firms on which the tax authority has data of adequate quality. Within 
the sample, large corporations account for approximately 10 per cent, medium-
sized enterprises 46 per cent, small enterprises 37 per cent, and microenterprises 
7 per cent of the total sales.
Table 2
Annual number of observations by sector
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Commerce 3,190 3,375 3,547 3,215 2,918 1,710
Industry 4,372 4,594 4,773 4,418 4,079 2,502
Services 5,167 5,616 5,840 5,188 4,557 2,507
Total 12,729 13,585 14,160 12,821 11,554 6,719
Note: Authors’ calculation on the sample used for analysis
Based on the NACE classification, the sample included 3,665 firms in commerce, 
4,896 firms in industry, and 5,993 firms in services (Table 2). Except for 2015 (where 
the annual accounts were not available for all of the firms), the database includes 
data on an average of 12,000 to 13,000 firms, with a low ratio of new entries and 
exits.
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Table 3
Names of the variables
ACCOUNTS_PAYABLE: Accounts payable (purchases of goods and services)
ACCOUNTS_RECEIVABLE: Accounts receivable (goods and services)
ST_LOANS: Short-term loans
LT_LOANS: Long-term loans (for investment and development purposes)
ASSET: Total assets (for regression analysis, its logarithm is used: LOGASSET)
SALES: Net sales
AP_SALES: Accounts payable / Net sales
AR_SALES: Accounts receivable / Net sales
EBIT_SALES: Earnings before interest and taxes / Net sales
ST_LOANS_SALES: Short-term loans / Net sales
LT_LOANS_SALES: Long-term loans / Net sales
LEVERAGE: (Short-term liabilities + Long-term liabilities) / Total assets
CURRENT: Current assets / Short-term liabilities
CASH_SALES: (Cash and cash equivalents) / Net sales
INTEREST_COV: Interest coverage ratio: Earnings before interest and taxes /
(Interest payable and similar charges + Approved dividends and profit 
sharing)
CAPEX_SALES: (Fixed assets – Depreciation) /
Net sales
SALES_GROWTH: Sales growth rate as a percentage of the previous year
PROFIT_SALES Profit after taxest / Salest-1
ROE: Profit after taxest / Shareholders’ equityt-1
ROIC: NOPLATt / ICt-1 where: NOPLAT: EBIT × (1 – teff)
IC: Fixed assets + Current assets – Short-term liabilities
DIVIDEND_RATIO: Approved dividends and profit sharing / Profit after taxes
KZ: Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index for unlisted firms:
KZ = –1.002 × CF/ASSETS + 3.3139 × LEVERAGE – 39.368 × DIV  
– 1.315 × CASH/ASSETS
WW: Whited-Wu (2006) index:
WW = –0.091 × CF/ASSETS – 0.062 × DIVIDEND_PAYER + 0.021 × LEVERAGE
– 0.044 × LOGASSET + 0.102 × IND_SALES_GROWTH  
– 0.035 × SALES_GROWTH
where IND_SALES_GROWTH is the industry average sales growth (NACE 2 
digits), and DIVIDEND_PAYER is the dummy for firms paying dividends
CLEARY: Cleary (1999) index:
CLEARY = –0.119 × CURRENT – 1.904 × LEVERAGE + 0.001 × INTEREST_COV
+1.456 × PROFIT_SALES + 2.035 × SALES_GROWTH – 0.048 × SLACK,
where the indicator of financial slack
SLACK = (Cash and cash equivalents + 0.5 × Inventories  
+ 0.7 × (Accounts receivable – Short-term liabilities)) / Fixed assets
COST_SALES Material costs 
AP_COST_SALES: Accounts payable / Material costs
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Table 3 lists the short names and descriptions of the variables used in our analysis. 
In the international literature, it is common (cf. e.g. Petersen and Rajan 1997, 
Nilsen 2002, Cunningham 2005, or Bougheas, Mateut and Mizen 2007) that 
instead of using the AP/Sales ratio to derive the Days Payable Outstanding (AP/
COST_SALES × 365) variable, it is used as a measure of the size of accounts payable, 
normalised for the size of sales. For the sake of international comparability, we have 
opted for the latter variable. We measured accounts payable using the “Accounts 
payable (purchases of goods and services)” line of the balance sheets. To identify 
short-term loans, we used data from the “Short-term loans” line within the “Short-
term liabilities” item of the balance sheet, disregarding the “Short-term advances” 
item. The item short-term loans may also include repayments due within one year 
on loans maturing in more than one year; to that extent, a critical approach is 
needed to our findings concerning short maturities. Although the item chosen 
does not necessarily include bank loans only, in terms of its function it aggregates 
short-term funds that are not from suppliers, and as such may be considered as an 
alternative to trade credit.
With one indicator group (AP_SALES, AR_SALES, CASH_SALES, ST_LOANS_SALES, 
LT_LOANS_SALES, SALES_GROWTH, AP/COST_SALES) we winsorised the upper 1 per 
cent, whereas in other cases (EBIT_SALES, PROFIT_SALES, CAPEX_SALES, ROIC) this 
was done for both the lower and upper 1 per cent. With more special variables we 
applied different rules, e.g. COVERAGE_RATIO (20%; 70%), INTEREST_COV (20%; 
70%), SLACK (5%; 90%), ROE (8%; 90%).
We summarised the descriptive statistics on the most important variables in the 
database in Table 4. In Panel A, we considered data for the entire 2010–2015 period, 
while Panel B only contains data for 2011–2015, because with several calculated 
ratios the denominator contains a value for 2010. In the sample, the median of 
accounts payable was approximately HUF 16 million, and that of accounts payable 
was HUF 20.5 million. More than one third of the firms had short-term bank debt, 
and a smaller percentage had long-term bank debt. The median of total assets was 
HUF 385 million in the sample. The median of the AP/Sales ratio was 5 per cent, 
and that of the AR/Sales around 8.4 per cent.
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Table 4
Summary statistics
Panel A: Key items
(HUF thousands) N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) Max
ACCOUNTS_PAYABLE 71,568 105,172 228,182 0 694 15,916 98,422 2,138,715
ACCOUNTS_RECEIVABLE 71,568 154,412 404,037 0 976 20,588 139,871 16,552,101
ST_LOANS 71,568 75,464 390,532 0 0 0 17,542 15,724,355
LT_LOANS 71,568 26,932 142,189 0 0 0 0 2,146,469
ASSET 71,568 1,254,481 7,441,845 1 51,983 385,357 1,172,100 1,240,000,000
SALES 71,568 1,220,289 2,762,188 101 35,276 332,765 1,300,015 111,000,000
Panel B: Indicators describing operations
Ratios N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) Max
AP_SALES 57,014 0.139 0.352 0.000 0.010 0.050 0.127 2.838
AR_SALES 57,014 0.154 0.258 0.000 0.016 0.084 0.182 1.805
EBIT_SALES 57,014 –0.053 0.747 –5.643 0.000 0.035 0.111 0.964
ST_LOANS_SALES 57,014 0.074 0.263 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.033 2.126
LT_LOANS_SALES 57,014 0.049 0.270 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.362
LEVERAGE 57,014 0.488 0.302 0.000 0.232 0.473 0.734 0.989
CURRENT 57,014 3.555 5.388 0.000 0.960 1.538 3.109 22.548
CASH_SALES 57,014 0.352 1.081 0.000 0.017 0.066 0.220 8.546
INTEREST_COV 57,014 4.753 12.281 –14.587 0.007 1.865 21.187 22.445
CAPEX_SALES 57,014 0.074 0.408 –1.653 0.000 0.012 0.058 2.777
SALES_GROWTH 57,014 0.186 0.958 –1.000 –0.119 0.028 0.200 7.063
ROE 57,014 0.155 0.521 –0.907 0.002 0.085 0.316 1.201
ROIC 57,014 0.247 1.302 –4.487 –0.000 0.076 0.256 8.685
In empirical literature on corporate finance, the variables measuring the presence 
of financial constraints are compared by Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014) and 
Elsas and Klepsch (2016). Of the variables used by the authors, we measure the 
presence of constraints on access to short-term bank credit against the three most 
common variables: the Kaplan–Zingales, the Whited–Wu and the Cleary indices 
for unlisted firms. We define the presence of financial constraints based on the 
statistical procedures summarised in Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014). The 
Kaplan–Zingales and Whited–Wu indices and the Cleary index multiplied by minus 
one are arranged in ascending order, and then observations above the upper 30th 
percentile are defined as unconstrained, and those below the lower 30th percentile 
are defined as constrained. Items in the middle 40 per cent belong to neither class 
and are considered as representing a grey zone. We applied this procedure and the 
sorting to the entire sample and to the entire firm/year observation. This means 
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that the classification of certain firms may change over the year, but change is not 
characteristic of the sample. The three classifications are compared in Table 5. 
Except for large corporations, the Kaplan–Zingales approach can be used to classify 
firms more or less independently of firm size. With large firms, the share of firms at 
the limit of their capacity constraints is about 50 per cent, which indicates the poor 
reliability of the KZ procedure (in their original paper, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
used a relatively homogeneous sample to estimate the index for categories based 
on self-assessment). The Cleary procedure has a moderate tendency, while the 
Whited–Wu procedure has a strong tendency to classify smaller firms, particularly 
microenterprises, as financially constrained. It is to be noted that these procedures 
are also not considered to be perfect alternatives in the international literature, 
which is why we use several classifications for our analyses.
Table 5
Classification of financial constraint measures
Size Year
Number 
of firms
Number of financially constrained firms in each classification
KZ CLEARY WW KZ & 
CLEARY
KZ & 
WW
CLEARY 
& WW
All 
three KZ / All
CLEARY 
/ All
WW / 
All
Large 2011 68 39 5 0 3 0 0 0 57% 7% 0%
Large 2012 68 35 5 1 2 1 1 1 51% 7% 1%
Large 2013 67 30 8 1 3 1 1 1 45% 12% 1%
Large 2014 67 34 6 0 2 0 0 0 51% 9% 0%
Large 2015 34 14 6 1 1 0 1 0 41% 18% 3%
Medium 2011 1,269 434 143 5 63 5 0 0 34% 11% 0%
Medium 2012 1,310 431 181 11 80 9 7 5 33% 14% 1%
Medium 2013 1,298 416 195 15 79 11 12 9 32% 15% 1%
Medium 2014 1,254 365 192 18 64 13 12 9 29% 15% 1%
Medium 2015 734 184 128 9 43 6 9 6 25% 17% 1%
Small 2011 3,966 1,177 698 110 317 72 50 32 30% 18% 3%
Small 2012 4,201 1,233 867 121 353 86 74 49 29% 21% 3%
Small 2013 4,168 1,150 864 134 369 92 103 68 28% 21% 3%
Small 2014 3,967 1,041 818 131 324 86 90 57 26% 21% 3%
Small 2015 2,333 498 494 72 160 47 57 35 21% 21% 3%
Micro 2011 8,282 2,497 2,791 4,110 1,085 1,538 1,827 656 30% 34% 50%
Micro 2012 8,581 2,735 3,273 4,392 1,200 1,684 2,164 799 32% 38% 51%
Micro 2013 7,288 2,179 2,706 3,448 957 1264 1,659 576 30% 37% 47%
Micro 2014 6,266 1,758 2,311 2,873 773 976 1,390 446 28% 37% 46%
Micro 2015 3,618 854 1,413 1,652 388 477 888 240 24% 39% 46%
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In the first analysis, we examine how accounts payable are related to short-term 
and long-term bank loans and generally to accounts receivable under constrained 
access to bank finance. For that purpose, the following regression equations are 
estimated:
AP/SALES = ST_LOANS/SALES + LT_LOANS/SALES + AR/SALES +
 + controls + Firm FE + Year FE 
(1)
AP/SALES = ST_LOANS/SALES + LT_LOANS/SALES + AR/SALES +
 + FINC_Dummy + FINC_Dummy × ST_LOANS/SALES + (1A)
 + controls + Firm FE + Year FE 
AP/SALES = ST_LOANS/SALES + LT_LOANS/SALES + AR/SALES +
 + FINC_Dummy + FINC_Dummy × LT_LOANS/SALES + (1B)
 + controls + Firm FE + Year FE 
AP/SALES = ST_LOANS/SALES + LT_LOANS/SALES + AR/SALES +
 + FINC_Dummy + FINC_Dummy × AR/SALES + (1C)
 + controls + Firm FE + Year FE 
where FINC_Dummy (financially constrained) is the indicator variable for financially 
constrained firms beyond their capacity for bank debt. Firm FE indicates firm fixed 
effects, and Year FE the time fixed effects. The control variables include all variables 
that, in addition to the effects in individual firms, adequately capture individual 
operational and growth characteristics: firm size (log(ASSET)), operating margin 
(EBIT_SALES), profitability (ROE), interest coverage ratio (INTEREST_COV), leverage 
ratio (LEVERAGE) lagged, liquidity ratio (CURRENT) lagged, cash to sales ratio (CASH_
SALES) lagged, capital expenditures to sales (CAPEX_SALES) lagged, dividend ratio 
(DIVIDEND_RATIO), sales growth (SALES_GROWTH).
The first idea for constructing Equation (1A) came from Cunningham (2005), 
but we use different set of base and control variables. Equation (1B) explores 
the relationship of accounts payable and long-term credit in order to determine 
whether firms increase their long-term credit by increasing trade credit. Equation 
(1C) is not derived from the theoretical model, but is based rather on practical 
considerations. In this case, we seek to determine whether in cases with higher 
AR/Sales ratios firms pass financing on to their suppliers.
In the second analysis, we also examine access to trade credit. In the theoretical 
model, Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) consider the wealth of the firm to determine 
the finance option in terms of which the firm will become constrained. In the case of 
high wealth, firms are less reliant on external funds, and neither constraint applies. 
In the case of medium wealth, they exploit their capacities for bank debt, but not 
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that for trade debt. In the case of low wealth, they are strongly reliant on external 
funds, and as such face constraint in both forms. As firms’ wealth is difficult to 
observe, average profitability (EBIT/ASSET, i.e. Earnings before interest and taxes 
to Total assets) is used as a proxy for wealth, the rationale being that a highly 
profitable firm has the ability to utilise internal funds. We divide the database into 
three sub-samples according to low (<0 per cent), medium (0–14 per cent) and 
high (>14 per cent) business profitability based on the firms’ average EBIT/ASSET 
ratios. On the sub-samples, of the previous model specifications we run (1A) for 
the three constraint indicators, of which we use only the indicator variable for 
firms constrained in their access to bank finance, and consider the control group as 
including both the grey zone and firms unconstrained in their access to bank credit.
In our third analysis, we seek to determine the extent to which firm size influences 
the relationship between trade credit and short-term bank credit. In the case of 
US firms, Nilsen (2002) found firm size to be the factor that adequately captured 
access, although he did not carry out his analyses on micro-level panel data. We 
re-estimate our previous Equations (1) and (1A) for four sub-samples, i.e. the groups 
of large, medium, small and microenterprises, using the criteria for sales (EUR 50 
million, EUR 10 million, and EUR 2 million, respectively; assuming an exchange 
rate of EUR/HUF 300) from the size definitions commonly applied to Hungarian 
firms. In a supplier-buyer relationship, larger size may give a firm more bargaining 
power over its supplier, as a result of which larger firms rarely face strict supplier 
constraints. Primarily, we seek to determine the extent to which this relationship is 
captured by firm size, but exploring the differences between firms of various sizes 
could in itself also produce noteworthy findings. For that purpose, the previously 
constructed Equation (1A) is again estimated with the three constraint dummies.
The fourth analysis quantifies the sensitivity of trade credit to business cycles. For 
each sub-sample (segmented by size), the following regression equation is used to 
obtain a direct estimate of days payable outstanding:
AP/COST_SALES × 365 = AR/SALES × 365 + ST_LOANS/SALES + LT_LOANS/SALES +
+ FINC_Dummy + FINU_Dummy + YEAR_Dummytt=1
4∑  +
 + YEAR_Dummytt=1
4∑  × FINC_Dummy + (2)
+ YEAR_Dummytt=1
4∑  × FINU_Dummy +
 + controls + Firm FE 
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where the dummies FINC and FINU (financially unconstrained) do not cover the 
entire sample, given that 40 per cent of it falls into the grey zone. From the estimate, 
we seek to establish time fixed effects and the interactions with those effects. In 
other words, we seek to determine the developments in days payable outstanding, 
solely attributable to cyclical effects and other things being equal, for the segments 
of firms with varying access to finance, assuming their capacities for bank debt to 
be exploited. For this purpose, we multiply the dependent variable by 365 days in 
order to construe the result in terms of days. As regards the COST_SALES variable, 
we also had to take into account the fact that not all firms follow the same logic in 
calculating the effect of the cost of sales on profits. Some of the firms submitted P/L 
accounts on a total cost basis, and others on a turnover basis. The base which, if not 
settled immediately, could become accounts payable, was the sum of materials and 
consumables and contracted services in the first case, and the sum of the cost of 
goods sold and the value of services sold in the second case. Both types of reporting 
included the item of material costs, which differed from the sum calculated using 
the two methods in fewer than 1 per cent of all cases, and even then the difference 
was small.
Regressions were estimated with the fixed effects within panel method, where 
unique firm fixed effects were filtered using the within estimator, and time (year) 
effects using dummy variables. The panels are unbalanced because it was possible 
for the firms observed to be included in the sample for less than five years. Both 
the Breusch–Pagan and the Honda LM test rejected the null hypothesis that the 
time effect was not significant in the regressions. Unique (firm) effects were also 
mostly significant. The Hausmann tests run for the estimates supported the use of 
fixed effects versus random effects. The error terms of the estimated models implied 
heteroscedasticity, but in the error terms autocorrelation was not significant for 
four observation years. Consequently, we used White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors for our statistical tests.
5. Results
The estimation results for the first question of our analysis (Equations (1), (1A), (1B) 
and (1C)) are summarised in Table 6, where the coefficients of the basic equation 
are shown in the first column, followed by the three equations with the constraint 
indicators derived using classifications based on the Kaplan–Zingales, Whited–Wu 
and Cleary indices. The dependent variable is the ratio of accounts payable to sales, 
which is reported as multiplied by 100 to ensure the readability of the coefficients. 
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Based on an overview of the table, we find that the level of accounts payable was 
increased by the presence of bank credit in all estimates, which is implied by the 
significantly positive ST_LOAN_SALES coefficients. Due to the specific nature of 
the within estimator, R-square values are low, but overall the variables significantly 
explain the ratio of accounts payable with a 1 per cent threshold for each of the 
regression equations.
In the estimate for the basic equation, with firms where the ratio of short-term 
loans to sales was 10 percentage points (0.1) higher, the ratio of accounts payable 
was also 1.269 percentage points higher on average. This essentially suggests that 
if Burkart and Ellingsen’s theoretical model is assumed to be correct, and this kind 
of complementarity is observed in low-wealth firms that are constrained in their 
access to both trade credit and bank credit, then according to the authors’ theory 
most Hungarian firms are financially constrained. This could also mean that the 
credit constraint indicators introduced capture the extent of the capacity constraint 
rather than the fact of its presence.
A brief overview of the coefficients obtained for the control variables is also 
appropriate. We found that larger firms and those working with higher profit 
margins have a lower average AP-to-sales ratio. The ROE indicator, as a measure 
of profitability, failed to significantly explain the size of accounts payable, while 
the coefficient of the dividend ratio showed zero effect. For firms with a higher 
level of indebtedness, we found higher accounts payable in the following year. 
The AP-to-sales ratio was observed to be higher for firms with higher cash ratios, 
and lower for firms with higher growth rates. All of this is not contrary to general 
business intuition.
Financial constraint indicators did not produce consistent results in every case. 
Other than the above argument, this could also result from the differences in 
constructing the indicators, as well as from the fact that the indices used for 
classification were constructed on US data, while differences in the firms’ operations 
may also undermine the reliability of application. Consequently, we only consider 
estimation results as robust where all three indicators produced similar results. Note 
that in interpreting our results, we refer to firms as constrained where the value of 
bank credit is one, and unconstrained where the value is zero (grey zone and firms 
marked as unconstrained above the 30th percentile collectively).
In analysing Equations (1A), we essentially found short-term loans and accounts 
payable to be complementary. In themselves, constraint dummy indicators produced 
mostly insignificant or inconsistent results, but interactions were significant 
and combined effects (with an average volume of short-term loans) also imply 
complementarity.
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In the case of Equations (1B), no correlation was found between long-term credit 
and accounts payable: estimating for the entire sample, there is no evidence of 
any relationship between taking out additional long-term loans and the use of 
accounts payable.
Estimates for Equations (1C) show that in financially unconstrained firms, an 
increase in accounts receivable in a given year will be accompanied by a higher ratio 
of trade credit. On the entire sample, for financially constrained firms combined 
effects are both insignificant and contradictory. This implies that the ability of firms 
to pass financing on to their suppliers may depend on sector, size and other factors.
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The results of the second analysis are summarised in Table 7. We estimated 
Equations (1) and (1A) on three sub-samples. These included firms (a) with negative 
average EBIT/ASSET ratios (representing the lower 26.6 per cent of the sample); (b) 
ratios between 0 and 14 per cent; and (c) ratios above 14 per cent (representing the 
upper 18.7 per cent of the sample). The selection of the thresholds was determined 
by the fact that firms with average negative performance are adequately described 
by Burkart and Ellingsen’s low wealth, while the average 14 per cent threshold was 
supported by the tendency that in business practice, a higher level of profitability 
already enables firms to raise internal funds, and the fact that the number of items 
in the sub-sample is not very low either.
The propositions of Burkart and Ellingsen’s model are only partially confirmed by 
our empirical results. In the first sub-sample, we are able to confirm the predicted 
complementarity. In this subsample, according to the theory, constraints apply in 
terms of both trade credit and bank credit, which is why a breakdown of the analysis 
by KZ, WW and Cleary-based indicators would not make any sense. Nevertheless, 
these indicators, constructed on the basis of other theories, will classify firms as 
both constrained and unconstrained even in this range. In such cases, the indicators 
are construed as suggesting that it is difficult for all participants to access bank 
credit due to their low profitability, and the capacity constraint actually even more 
applies to firms that are also marked by the indices. This will make short-term loans 
and accounts payable complements on the sub-sample: a higher ratio of loans will 
be accompanied by higher accounts payable; however, the result is only robust for 
severely constrained firms where the combined effects also include interactions. 
The second sub-sample shows barely significant complementarity in Equation (1). In 
such a case, for constrained firms the theoretical model would predict substitution, 
but we found none. We consider it plausible that under Burkart and Ellingsen’s 
theory this falls in the category of low wealth, which explains the complementarity 
found. In the third sub-sample, that of highly profitable firms, we found no 
correlation at a significance level of 0.05, and neither is correlation predicted 
according to the theory. If we accept that we were overly lenient in selecting the 
wealth threshold, then zero effect could mean that the sub-sample includes firms 
characterised by substitution as well as firms characterised by complementarity. By 
way of comparison to research carried out on Canadian data for similar purposes, 
Cunningham (2005) did not succeed in identifying the third category, but did identify 
complementarity in the first category and then substitution in the second.
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In terms of substitution, noteworthy features are identified by the analysis carried 
out on sub-samples by firm size, the results of which are reported in Table 8. In 
the sub-sample of large corporations, the estimated coefficient of short-term 
loans is always negative. This implies substitution in the case of large corporations 
(regardless of whether they have become financially constrained according to 
the three indices). The model did not produce an estimate for the Whited–Wu 
interaction (presumably because only zero or one company is marked by the index 
as constrained), and the other two indices were found to be inconsistent. In this 
scenario, we should argue that the relationship between large corporations and 
banks is different from other cases, i.e. that often the size of large corporations 
makes it easier for them to use trade credit rather than bank credit, which represents 
the case of “medium wealth” in Burkart and Ellingsen’s theory. In the category of 
medium and small enterprises, we found significant complementarity between bank 
credit and trade credit for financially unconstrained firms. The KZ and WW indices 
also failed on this sub-sample; only the interaction of the CLEARY dummy was 
significant. With microenterprises (which are presumably constrained in terms of 
both forms of funding), we found no correlation in firms where the bank constraint 
did not actually apply, and found complementarity in firms where it did. This 
scenario corresponds to the case of “low wealth” in Burkart and Ellingsen’s model.
Table 9
Summary of the results of sub-sample analyses
Wealth (EBIT/ASSET)
Low (<0%)
(trade credit constraint 
applies)
Medium (0–14%)
(no trade credit 
constraint applies)
High (>14%)
(no trade credit 
constraint applies)
In general  
(where segmentation is 
solely based on EBIT/
ASSET)
strong 
complementarity*
complementarity no correlation*
Constrained 
(measured separately)
strong 
complementarity*
complementarity*  
(not robust)
(the category is not 
applicable to the model)
Unconstrained 
(measured separately)
(the category is not 
applicable to the model)
(the category is not 
applicable to the model)
no correlation*
Firm size
Micro Small/Medium Large
Constrained complementarity
complementarity (not 
robust)
substitution
Unconstrained no correlation
complementarity  
(not robust)
substitution
Note: In the upper part of the table, items marked with * indicate results that are consistent with the 
theory.
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Table 9 summarises the relationship between bank credit and trade credit on a 
case-by-case basis.
In the context of the empirical analysis, a few methodological limitations also 
emerged, in relation to which improvements may be appropriate in future 
research. It would be beneficial to construct the Kaplan–Zingales, Whited–Wu and 
Cleary indices on Hungarian data, and classify Hungarian firms on that basis. This 
would presumably produce more consistent estimates compared to our current 
results. Notwithstanding that, literature relying on US data is also divided over 
classification procedures. It is even uncertain whether average profitability can 
adequately capture the wealth variable used in the theoretical model. Although in 
prior investigations we arrived at similar results in breakdowns by other variables, 
we do not believe that an indicator consisting of a single component could be a 
good separator. The outcome was somewhat improved when firm size was also 
taken into account. For that reason, it could be appropriate to use the Burkart and 
Ellingsen’s model to construct a trade credit constraint index on Hungarian data, 
which could be the Hungarian proxy for the model’s “wealth” variable.
Figure 2
Development of unique effects over time
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The trends of trade credit are addressed in our fourth analysis, which relates 
to Equation (2). Here we investigate the average development of days payable 
outstanding over time for financially constrained and financially unconstrained 
firms, adjusted for the unique (sector-specific, operational, etc.) characteristics of 
firms. By analysing the time effect, we wish to capture typical individual (non-
aggregated) responses to cyclical developments, i.e. a behavioural pattern. The 
results of the estimation are reported in Table 10, and the parts related to cyclicality 
are illustrated in Figure 2.
Table 10
Estimation of the development of days payable outstanding over time
(1A)
AP_COST_SALES × 365 Large Medium Small Micro
AR_SALES × 365 0.40** 0.44*** 0.56*** 0.34***
(0.13) (0.12) (0.07) (0.03)
LOANS_ST_per_SALES –19.17 170.07*** 71.65*** 33.26***
(30.11) (47.69) (19.32) (10.05)
LOANS_LT_per_SALES 87.99 191.95* 54.42· –3.46
(136.89) (86.87) (31.44) (10.89)
YEAR2013 1.69 3.12 4.99*** 5.06·
(3.93) (2.65) (1.46) (2.88)
YEAR2014 –2.79 4.19 6.83*** 3.11
(3.74) (3.54) (1.78) (3.53)
YEAR2015 1.92 –0.25 9.25*** 3.67
(4.63) (4.35) (2.46) (3.77)
D.KZ.constr –9.07* –7.92 –7.43 12.21*
(4.53) (6.35) (4.84) (5.83)
D.KZ.unconstr 2.01 0.28 3.98 –17.42***
(4.74) (3.41) (2.44) (3.73)
YEAR2013:D.KZ.constr 3.74 11.07· 8.51· 8.62
(5.66) (6.56) (4.64) (5.42)
YEAR2014:D.KZ.constr 8.54 7.42 11.18* 20.35**
(5.64) (4.84) (4.65) (6.83)
YEAR2015:D.KZ.constr 2.91 11.57· 14.83* 26.36**
(7.66) (7.02) (6.94) (9.17)
YEAR2013:D.KZ.unconstr –3.73 –4.60 –2.58 1.67
(5.45) (3.55) (2.06) (4.03)
YEAR2014:D.KZ.unconstr 4.96 –3.62 –4.77* 3.62
(6.27) (3.46) (2.30) (4.50)
YEAR2015:D.KZ.unconstr –5.29 –2.31 –4.20 3.40
(5.90) (5.32) (2.83) (4.82)
lag(LOGASSET) –6.79 –20.08** –31.20*** –19.82***
(4.12) (6.99) (7.21) (3.80)
EBIT_per_SALES 14.91 –23.91 –27.63* –3.42
(10.99) (16.35) (10.97) (3.27)
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Table 10
Estimation of the development of days payable outstanding over time
(1A)
AP_COST_SALES × 365 Large Medium Small Micro
ROE –6.79 5.70 –4.80 7.14*
(4.16) (4.03) (4.18) (2.84)
COVERAGE_RATIO 0.01 0.01 0.01· 0.01*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
lag(LEVERAGE) 30.72 3.05 59.10*** 14.91·
(18.66) (25.04) (15.64) (8.25)
lag(CURRENT) 0.03 0.37 0.19 0.60*
(1.88) (0.57) (0.79) (0.27)
lag(CASH_per_SALES) 292.14*** 1.81 18.86· 6.27**
(85.81) (13.33) (9.76) (2.34)
lag(CAPEX_per_SALES) 222.38* 3.22 –11.66 –4.37
(86.39) (40.23) (7.17) (3.46)
SALES_GROWTH –10.26· –2.98 –3.48 –8.09***
(6.06) (3.58) (3.47) (1.62)
DIVIDEND_RATIO 0.54 0.82 0.02 –0.00***
(0.41) (0.73) (0.01) (0.00)
N 235 4,432 13,739 24,000
n 68 1,332 4,352 8,790
T 2012–2015 2012–2015 2012–2015 2012–2015
R2 0.7289 0.3613 0.2706 0.0748
Note: ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; ·p < 0.1 ; while character ‘:’ represents interaction between 
variables.
Although the estimation coefficients were not found to be statistically significant for 
large corporations and medium-sized enterprises, and thus the results are primarily 
applicable to small and microenterprises, all categories are represented. The 
diagrams are based on the average days payable outstanding in 2012 for unclassified 
firms. The diagrams show the differences relative to the base for each type.
Based on the estimated coefficients, days payable outstanding are found to have 
increased in financially constrained microenterprises. Between 2012 and 2013, a 
relatively moderate increase is also indicated for firms which are unconstrained 
according to their Kaplan–Zingales classification. The increase is also observed for 
constrained small enterprises, which implies pro-cyclical behaviour. By contrast, 
rather than an increase at a similar rate, stagnation is found for unconstrained firms.
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6. Summary
This paper investigates the role of trade credit in Hungarian non-financial, non-utility 
firms that submit annual accounts prepared in Hungarian forints. In 2010–2015, 
firms initially faced difficulties in accessing finance and then benefited from the 
easing of terms. In this study, we sought to determine how firm’s use of trade 
credit was related to their use of bank credit. For our empirical analysis, we relied 
on Burkart and Ellingsen’s (2004) theory. Although it was only possible to partially 
confirm the theory, some findings of practical relevance were made beyond the 
scope of the theory on the basis of our data. On the entire sample, we found short-
term loans and accounts payable to be complementary, the effect of which was 
stronger in firms that better exploited their capacity for bank debt. For firms with 
low own funds (equivalent to low wealth in Burkart and Ellingsen’s model and a low 
EBIT/Sales ratio in the statistical analysis), we found strong complementarity, while 
no substitution could be demonstrated for highly profitable firms. We repeated the 
analysis in a breakdown by firm size, which indicated substitution in the category of 
large corporations. Although firm size cannot be considered as a proxy for wealth, 
we thought it important to document the differences in the other size categories 
as well. In the paper, primarily for illustration purposes, we also represented the 
trend of trade credit over time in a breakdown by size, and found that in the period 
of improving finance, the role of trade credit became more prominent in financially 
constrained firms, and remained level in unconstrained firms.
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